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11.1. Introduction.
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on some of the major problems of the existing pension
systems. It is currently held that those systems exhibit fundamental imbalances which call for radical
reform. It is in fact a widely shared view that current systems are unsustainable: hence the questions
concerning the design of reform, together with the associated problem of identifying feasible patterns
of transition from the inherited system to the reformed one.
Accordingly the first issue to be addressed will be to highlight the fundamental imbalances
affecting the existing systems and illustrate how they have come into being historically. Then the
issue of the transition patterns will be tackled with reference to alternative reform designs; the
argument, on this second point, will be mostly theoretical. Finally our considerations will be brought
to bear on the actual features and on the current progress of the systems of the five countries treated
in this report and a judgment on feasibility and likely prospects will be formulated. A questionnaire
has been prepared for the five countries in this project.
It is worth mentioning immediately that the problem of transition is currently understood to
revolve basically around two main points. A first point concerns  measures for starting a path leading
from a redistributive or pay-as-you-go system back to the saving-insurance principle or, in other
words,  to a funded system; a second point touches on the share of private insurers in the pension
business.  Through tackling  our question we expect to contribute to put such and similar issues in a
proper perspective.  The analysis of the kind of unsustainability  involved here will allow us to see
how far the proposed measures can actually promise to cope with the inherent problems.
The current conventional wisdom on the transition issue calls for immediate clarification. It will be
seen below that pension systems can be classified with respect to a number of contrasting
characteristics, so that in principle it is possible to think of transitions between all the possible states
defined in terms of all the sets of compatible characteristics. However, historically, taking the
experience of major western European industrial systems into account, a few specific sets of
characteristics need contrasting. Basically, we propose to focus on a few contrasting characteristics:
payg vs. funded, defined benefit vs. defined contribution systems and redistributional vs. actuarial
ones.
The above clusters of characteristics provide important schemes to understand the present
situation.  Looking at future arrangements and at the transitions to them, it will be necessary to be
more imaginative and also think of  new schemes.4
11.2. The path to unsustainability.
a)  The lack of actuarial balance.
The English expression of welfare state is of fairly recent coinage, while the corresponding
German concept of Wohlfahrtsstaat is of much more ancient usage. It dates back at least to the
XVIII century and Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi's Staatswirtschaft, of 1755, may be mentioned.
This reminds us of the administrative view of the economy, which remains to the present day a very
important sense of the word and is of course  implied by its very etymon.  The welfare state in the
modern sense  arises historically at a later stage, in Germany itself, at the time when Otto von
Bismarck was ruling. In particular it was during the 1880s that the German government legislated to
establish the first modern social security system in the world, that being the core of the welfare state
as a more general and comprehensive system. In that system social insurance as an individual right
came to be affirmed.
We may here confine ourselves to recall two paradigmatic figures, particularly in the second half
of the XIX century, which appear to embody the main aspects of the German welfare state model:
Lorenz von Stein and Gustav von Schmoller.  The idea of Sozialstaat, the modern social state
(Demaria, 1946),  emerges through Stein's work and his Verwaltungslehre.  From the notion of
Klassenbewusstsein,  brought forward by  Stein  as early as 1842, i.e. before  the Marx-Engels
Manifesto, Stein - following a route quite different from Marx - derives the idea of 'social
democracy'.  Stein's work envisages a conservative agenda which aims, on one side, to overcoming
the contrast between capital and labour and integrating the labouring masses within the existing
machinery of the bourgeois state, while, on the other side, taking into account the subsidiarity
principle and the distinction between state and society; by sticking to the latter principle, he, to some
extent at least, is dodging the Tocquevillean "oppression" which is otherwise seen to be constantly
impending upon the life of modern democracies. In the same vein Schmoller's work is highly
representative of the so-called Kathedersozialismus and of the activity and ideals of the influential
Verein für Sozialpolitik. The multiplication of the economic functions of the State is well reflected in
"Wagner's law" (Adolph Wagner himself belongs to the 'Socialists-of-the-Chair'); a great deal of such
functions, of course, do concern the social security and welfare.
While  the influence of the German strand of thought must be taken into consideration in creating
wide persuasions on the development of insurance as a vital sector to be run by the State itself, there
is also a different source to be discussed of the contemporary notion of welfare state; this is based on
the more general notion of social assistance. The latter source has strong connections with the
British and the Swedish experience (Ritter, 1991, esp. ch. 4.2). Sweden and England - Ritter argues
(ibid.) - with their principle of state assistance during old age -  actually parted company, even befor
the first world war, from the German insurance system. These systems, starting their  development
early in the XX century,  contributed to consolidate the pioneering role of central and northern
Europe in social security. The factors behind this well-known phenomenon are linked to the early
diffusion particularly in central and northern Europe of the small nuclear family and the widespread
conditions of individualistic urban life. At the same time those regions of Europe had, generally5
speaking,  a stronger historic tradition of public assistance; coming to our century, moreover,  in
Sweden and Britain in particular, the influence of the rising labour movement - as an effective and
(with time) even dominant political force - starts to be felt.
These observations may be useful to place the rise of social security in historical perspective. The
German model, in particular, mainly builds on the insurance principle. Although, Bismarck's own
plans did envisage at an early stage a fairly large financial involvement by the State, his guidelines did
abide by the insurance principle; the more so, since a posteriori the financial burden borne by the
State turned out, in fact, to have been rather limited. The Swedish and British models, in their turn,
are strongly influenced by the assistance principle. Despite all the practical combinations of the two
principles, it is useful to keep them separate, especially as this distinction still lies at the centre of the
alternatives discussed today.
The elements involved in the distinction are essentially the following two:
1. the assistance principle contains an equalitarian bias and also
2. it weakens the link between individual costs and benefits, i.e. between contributions and
pensions.  In addition to these, there is another aspect which is often stressed:  the different models
may differ according to their coverage and can be distinguished into occupational and universal
schemes. Of course the solidarity implied by the assistance principle, by itself, tends to universality.
Britain in 1908 and shortly after Sweden in 1913 departed from the German model by
establishing, with different rules and coverage, a system of social security to be financed by the State.
In Britain in particular the departure from the 1834 Poor Law provisions was the outcome of the
political action of Asquith at the Exchequer and as a Prime Minister in 1908. The British reform first
established the principle of an income-tested non-contributory public pension available to all aged 70
or over. Sweden follows suit in 1913 with a pension to all aged 67 or above; in Sweden one part was
contributory and one part was financed by the State.  It may be appropriate to mention, in these
cases too, an ideological influence supporting social legislation, which may help to trace similarities
and differences with the German example at the time and also to detect long standing persuasions
which do tend to surface time and again under definite cultural and environmental circumstances.
The ideological element in question has to do with Fabianism and, perhaps more particularly, with
the enormous influence, especially in Britain, of the teachings of John Stuart Mill. Mill's distinction
between laws of production and principles of distribution has a central ideological importance.  In
J.S. Mill's view it is vital to make "the proper distinction between the laws of the Production of
Wealth, which are real laws of nature, dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of its
Distribution, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on human will" and are "liable to be much
altered by the progress of social improvement" (Mill, 1981, pp. 255,257).  The important implication
of this distinction is the following:  an advanced society, i.e. a society in which the laws of
production have been brought to work almost to their highest perfection, there is scope for
concentrating on distribution.  Social concerns are thus part of the self-complacency of a well-off
society.6
On the historical side, important implications on the development of social security systems came
first from the Great Depression and from the impact of the second world war. These historic events,
however, introduced quantitative, rather than qualitative, changes. This happened in Sweden, for
example, in the aftermath of the Great Depression. The case of Britain signals the impact and
significance of the second world war.
It would be impossible to understand the development of social security especially in Europe in
the last fifty years without taking into due account the threats posed by Bolshevism, Fascism and
Nazism. It was in that political environment and under the sense of insecurity generated by the
character of the second world war that the assistance principle came to prevail and was developed
into the ideology of the contemporary welfare state. At the centre of the stage, as a leading force, of
the new ideology is the Beveridge report of 1942, which significantly focusses  attention on social
security (Beveridge, 1942). The Beveridge philosophy - of which the reform of social security is only
one element, albeit of primary importance - is based on two ingredients that it is necessary to recall
here. The first ingredient is the notion of social rights as a new component of citizenship; social
rights  imply certain forms of assistance from the State to which the citizen as such is entitled. The
idea of 'social rights' is developed in the socio-political and economic literature at the time (cp.
Marshall, 1963). In the second place, as an ingredient more directly related  with social security, the
Beveridge philosophy is based on the idea of an intergenerational  compact, which would be best
expressed by the pay-as-you-go method.  Current pension payments, in fact, are not payments of an
income, but transfers - either through general taxation or through special contributions having the
nature of taxes -  to the old of income produced by the young.
The spread of the Beveridge philosophy, for our purposes in this paper, is equivalent to the
triumph of what we have termed the assistance principle in a rather pure form.  If we turn to our
present-day discussions on pension systems and reform, we may easily come to the conclusion that
they represent a signal instance of a present-day follow-up of the social rights philosophy. At the
time of Beveridge the other side of the moon, so to speak, was well described by Hayek's forceful
Road to Serfdom.  Hayek was respected by many but won little enthusiasm for his own feat. At the
level of economic and social philosophy, Schumpeter's rather despondent tone on the inevitable
March into Socialism, certainly seems to seize the countenance of the age. Today the tables have
been turned and, for example, positions favouring the so-called 'basic income' movement are not
holding sway.  It is important therefore to go beyond the positions of principle and understand how
the economic incentives interact, without taking a specific position as to their priority, with those
more general principles.
Four points must be made. The first point is that at the time of the Beveridge report the transition
to a pay-as-you-go principle appeared to provide an extremely appealing solution to the social
security problem. The second point is that, under the different present-day conditions, the burden of
contributions would be  increasing without an assignable limit if the Beveridge philosophy were to be
applied without contraints. The third point is that today the transfer principle as a solution is inferior
to the available alternatives in economic terms. Finally, what makes of 'transition' both a need and an7
awkward problem is the asymmetry in terms of economic feasibility between the Beveridge reform
on one side and the path of reform that is likely to enable our systems to reverse the Beveridge
philosophy on the other side. This difficulty is emphasized in the current literature (cp. Buchanan,
1986). The transition problem, therefore, lies at the centre of our social philosophy. It leads us to re-
define and reformulate our notion of civil society in its relationship with the competitive market (for
a classification of the possible regimes of social security with respect to their interaction with the
market order, cp. Titmuss, 1974, Esping-Andersen, 1990). Tackling the 'transition' issue today
means much more than solving a technical puzzle of our pension systems. It rather amounts to
questioning the Beveridge report as a benchmark of our notion of civil society. The difficulty is that,
on both sides of the barricade, disposing of the Beveridge approach is very often interpreted as an
unqualified recourse to the 'market', without giving due attention to the fact that the market order
itself requires the basis of 'civil society' for its proper definition.
The first and third points, just mentioned, are best assessed in terms of the rate of return of the
social security contributions. The second point has to do with the position of social security with
respect to growth. The last point outlines the great unresolved question of discussing a viable
solution.  While the term 'transition' suggests the idea that the alternative regime is a clearly
recognizable object, in fact this is hardly the case: the need to cope with an unsustainable situation is
in practice more prominent compared to the drive to an alternative ideal.
b) Negative incentives to growth.
As  has been stated above, the mood has now completely changed with respect to the Beveridge
philosophy. As one example, we may refer here to the widespread view  which asserts that the
existence of welfare state provisions in a system can be a source of relative decline, or, at any rate, it
can be a barrier to economic growth.
The Swedish Economic Commission, chaired by Assar Lindbeck, has referred to the crisis of the
Swedish model arguing that it has "resulted in institutions and structures that today constitute an
obstacle to economic efficiency and economic growth, because of their lack of flexibility and their
one-sided concerns for income safety and distribution, with limited concern for economic incentives"
(cp. Atkinson, 1995, pp. 121-31).
More particularly, if we restrict ourselves to deal with the social security system within the whole
set of welfare state provisions, two points seem to be of the highest relevance concerning the effects
of the spread of the Swedish model or the Beveridge philosophy (the two are equivalent for our
purposes):
1. reducing savings and capital accumulation
2. the creation of public debt.
From both perspectives it is important to focus on the basic character of the current pension
systems, which goes in fact back to the 'Beveridge philosophy'. It is part of the 'Beveridge
philosophy' that social security  should not follow  an insurance principle, but a taxation principle.8
More precisely, a  payg system, whatever the connection between contributions and benefits, simply
defines an implicit 'social contract' between generations.  Therefore it is that, behind the arguments
on the growth-hampering character of the welfare state, there is very often the thesis that the payg
principle is to be held responsible to that effect.  That is why it is so often emphasized that reform or
transition of pension systems may entail a return to the accumulation principle.
1. Savings.
Social security contributions, much as taxation, reduce savings and capital accumulation. A part at
least of the resources levied through the tax/contribution rate would have been saved and would thus
have been income passed on to capital accumulation.
The difference with taxation, here, is that the payment is done by one generation or cohort only
(the 'young') within the population, while the other generation (the 'old') receive a benefit. Why do
not the two contrary flows neutralize each other in terms of their effect on savings, if they are of an
equal amount?  That happens basically because the two generations have different propensities to
consume: equal to one for the 'old', less that one for the 'young'. Of course in the simple Keynesian
model or, to that effect, in Barro's model savings would not decrease. However, adopting a life-cycle
scheme where savings are reduced by social security, we come to view  the transition question, in
terms of incentives to growth, in the following way: is it invariably a good thing for growth to save
and accumulate more ?  Even the simplest Solow model of growth shows that a change in the saving
rate can be irrelevant to the the growth rate of the system. As Atkinson shows, the issue can be
discussed in the context of growth theory (Atkinson, 1995, esp. pp. 121 ff.).
2. Debt.
The introduction of payg systems makes social security similar to deficit finance in its effects in
crowding out capital formation and creating debt. Let us first observe that the social security
paradox (Aaron, 1966), showing the welfare advantage of a payg pension system, is only valid when
the sum of the rates of growth of population and wages exceeds the rate of interest.
Take wt  as unit labour earnings at time t, q the rate of social security contribution, g the rate of
growth of the wage rate, n the rate of growth of population, r the rate of interest.
Two expressions must be compared concerning the benefit received by the worker at time t + 1,
when he has grown 'old':
(1)   qwt(1+g)(1+n)
(2)   qwt(1+r)
Of course
(1) >,=,< (2) according as (approximately) n+g >,=,< r.9
If the > condition holds it is clear that all generations gain from payg social security. Otherwise
the paradox does not hold. This brings us to consider the issue of population and demographic















In other words: if  p is the average pension and P the number of pensioners w the average wage
rate and L the number of labourers, it is clear that we can express q as the product of two factors:
the replacement rate and the dependency ratio.
This fact has two consequences:
1. the initial steps of a payg system are invariably very easy going. Owing to the low number of
pensioners the dependency ratio is very low and this induces legislation to be generous on the
replacement ratio.
2. in 'defined benefit' systems the benefit is often defined in relation with wages earned in the
final year(s) of the working life. Therefore the replacement ratio tends to be rigid. If at the same time
either a) birth rates tumble or b) average lifetime increases, or both,  the system may run into trouble:
the updating of q becomes politically unacceptable and pension expenditure comes to be covered by
issuing public debt.
Thus 'transition' means changing an implicit intergenerational contract, or changing the mental
habit that people are born with a particular set social rights, entitling them to accumulate particular
net positive claims against society. It is a matter, as we argue in this chapter, of rethinking our civil
society and sense of belonging to a community and making it compatible with a particular budget
constraint.
So far we have been considering the unsustainability problem from the viewpoint of the push
factors, i.e. of those factors that have made the existing system not viable and therefore in need for
change.
There is however a pull factor, as it were, stressing the fact that payg artificially constrains our
systems within the low yields range, given by  n+g  as we have seen, compared to the yields available
on the stock market, where yields are often supposed in fact to be safely allowed to outstrip the
growth of incomes.10
11.3. Ways of organising the pension system and transition options.
Most countries have mandatory public systems organised on a payg, defined benefit basis. They
were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s with the hyper-inflation between the wars and the second
world war in fresh memory. This may be one reason for the choice of payg. Another reason may be
the fact that in those days the growth rate exceeded the rate of return in the capital markets, making
payg more profitable than funded systems, (see Samuelson, 1958, Aaron, 1966). There are many
reasons for reforming the systems today, the most often mentioned being their financial insanity and
the expected demographic development with ageing populations, putting extra pressure on the
systems. Another reason put forward is the fact that returns in the capital market have  long
exceeded the growth rate (Feldstein, 1996). Payg systems are also alleged to have negative effects on
economic performance, i.e effects on the functioning of the capital and labour markets, impeding
growth and causing excess burden.
In this section some of the choices of how to organise pension systems will be discussed and
transition possibilites between different designs will be analysed.











prices, growth rate and/or interest rate,
during earnings / contribution period
and during retirement / receiving period
It is often argued that you have to choose the whole menu, i e that there should be a necessity to
choose between one or the other side in the table. This, however, is a misconception, but some
restrictions will have to be put on the mixture to be feasible and efficient. There is nothing to prevent
a choice of, for example, a public, voluntary, funded, defined benefit system. But if a payg system is
preferred, it has to be made mandatory, be it public or private. The same holds if the intention is to
use the pension system for redistribution. An actuarial system can be defined benefit as well as
defined contributions, it can be mandatory or voluntary, and so on.
Some of the advocates of abolishing payg systems in favour of funded systems are confusing the
benefits reached by this transformation by simultaneously presupposing that other changes in the11
design of the pension system come automatically with this change. We are referring to the
misconception that a funded system also has to be an actuarial one. A payg system may have an
actuarial design just as a funded system may be designed to contain redistribution. The dividing line,
when it comes to redistibution and tax wedges, goes between mandatory and voluntary systems.
Thus the gains of decreasing deadweight losses in the labour market by tightly connecting
contributions to benefits has little to do with the transformation of a payg to a funded system.
We will focuse on a few contrasting characteristics: payg versus funded, defined benefit versus
defined contribution systems and redistributional versus actuarial ones.12
11.3.1. Distribution over the life cycle
The main purpose of a pension system is to secure income and consumption possibilities during
old ages. The distribution of consumption over the life cycle is determined by the level of the system.
If the system is voluntary the distribution is determined by intertemporal utility maximisation. There
are however efficiency reasons for a mandatory system. A system is made mandatory in order to
avoid adverse selection, myopia and free riding. If the system forces indivuals to "save" more than
they otherwise would, i.e. the obligatorium gives a binding restriction on the choice of the
consumption path, there will be utility losses which have to be weighed against efficiency gains.
With a given level of the system, the distibution over the life cycle also depends on whether the
system is funded or a payg. In a funded system the rate of return is given by the rate of return in the
capital market, in a payg system by the growth rate of the economy.  Pensions are "guaranteed" by
the capital market in a funded system. In a payg system future production "guarantees" pensions, as
long as future generations continue their adherence to the system: a payg system may be viewed as
an implicit social contract between generations. If it is a mandatory system used for intra-
generational redistribution, the individual return may of course be higher or lower than the interest
rate or the growth rate.13
11.3.2.  Effects on economic performance.
Public payg systems are often presupposed to cause a lower growth than funded systems and also
to cause inefficiencies and deadweight losses.
One way a payg system may discourage growth is through its effects on capital accumulation and
the capital stock. A life cycle approach to consumption and saving gives savings for old age as the
main reason for capital accumulation. With a payg system this reason for saving disappears. It
deserves mentioning however that in a fully built up funded system with a stable population there is
no net saving for old ages; the savings of the active generation are offset by the dissavings of the
pensioners. With a certain amount of ageing of the population the dissaving of the pensioners will
even exceed the savings of the working generation. In the model used and the empirical work done
by Cigno et al. (ch. 10 in this report), not treating fertility as an exogenous factor, quite a contrary
result - an increase in savings - is obtained.  Whether a payg system results in a decrease in total
savings or not is judged to be an empirical question and there have been a number of econometric
studies trying to determine the effects.
Feldstein (1974) estimates the savings in the US to be 40% less due to social security system.
Munnel (1974) finds the direction of the effect on savings the same as in Feldstein, but significantly
less than the result of Feldstein. Barro (1978) concludes that it is not possible to reject the
hypotheses that the pension system lowers the saving rate. There is no evidence, however, that this is
the case. Transfers between generations are emphasized. i.e. the possible existence of  the Ricardo-
equivalence. Ståhlberg (1988) shows how sensitive the estimated effectd on savings are to the
assumptions concerning the alternative way of support in old age. Empirical studies on Sweden, for
example, suggest that the saving ratio would have been 1,5 to 4 percentage points higher without the
ATP-system during the 1960s and 1970s.
A second source of growth is population growth, or rather, growth of the labour force, which can
be broken down into a pure demographic factor, a change in participation rates and a labour-
augmenting change in productivity. In all of the industrialised world we have a secularly declining
fertility. Economic theory of demography finds a relation between social old-age insurance systems
and the declining fertility. The utility of many children is reduced with the introduction of a pension
system. (Cigno, 1992, Felderer, 1992. See also chapter 10 in this volume). For this effect to occur it
does not matter whether the system is funded or a payg one. However, if an ageing population
means greater difficulties in a payg system than in a funded one, this effect on fertility is more
devastating to a payg system. It should also be pointed out that with a payg system there is a
redistribution from families with many children to families with few children (Breyer & Schulenburg,
1990). This may afford a reason why some plea is made for subsidizing child rearing in  payg systems
(cp. Augusztinovics, 1995).
Low economic growth, threatening the stability of a payg-system, may thus be caused by the
pension system itself. This may occur not only because of its effects on savings and fertility; labour
supply will without doubt respond to the rules in the system. Also, some of the growth will most
certainly be transformed into leisure time, leisure being a good with a positive income elasticity. This14
will impede growth in the 'tax' base and reduce the rate of return in the payg system (cp. Kruse,
1989, 1994, for a discussion of the labour market responses and their repercussions in a payg
system).. If the pension system is used for redistribution in the sense that it is not designed as an
actuarial one, the contributions become taxes. The text book result is deadweight losses, greater the
greater the labour elasticity. Pension systems are long term commitments, suggesting high labour
elasticity.15
11.3.3 Introducing and reforming pension systems.
There is an asymmetry in the choice of system. The introduction of a payg system will be a Pareto
improvement, because of the increased consumption possibilities it gives to the initial generation.
This is one of the conclusions to be drawn from Samuelson, 1958 (if, however, the so-called Ricardo
equivalence holds, this increase in consumption will not take place, see Barro, 1974). This holds
provided that the system does not impede savings and growth, thus lowering the consumption
possibilities of the future generations. But even so there will always be the temptation for each and
every generation to introduce a payg-system. The introducing generation will be able to consume
both out of an existing capital stock saved for old ages and out of the benefits given by the payg
system.
We may distinguish between three different groups in a payg system. The initial generation has a
rate of return that is greater than the growth rate, a return that  may even tend towards infinity. An
example may be given from the Swedish experience. When the ATP system was inroduced in
Sweden, it was not introduced on a full scale immediately. In the beginning the benefits were low,
but so were also the contributions paid, resulting in a very high rate of return. Ståhlberg, 1993, has
calculated the benefit/contribution ratio to be 5.9% for those born between 1905-1914, 3.7% for
1915-1923, 2.0 for 1924-1933, 1.2 for 1934-1943 and less than 1% (ca. 0.8%) for the first
generation not belonging to the initial ones, those born between 1944-1950. The middle
generation(s) have a rate of return equal to the the growth rate. The terminal generation has a rate of
return that is lower than the rate of growth and may even tend towards zero.
Up until now the generations in the payg systems have had returns that by far surpass the growth
rate. The reason is that the benefits have been increased a number of times without increasing the
contributions for those being covered by the increased benefits. This may be thought of as evidence
for the so-called Browning effect (Browning, 1975), which clearly has been at hand both in Italy and
Sweden (see respective country chapter) as well as in US, according to Feldstein (1996).
From a payg system to a funded one
Changing in the other direction, from a payg-system to a funded system, would, however, hardly
be approved of using the Pareto-criterion; such a change inevitably overburdens a terminal
generation, who loses the contribution made to contemporary pensioners and  thus have to pay
double contributions to provide for their own old age as well.
The outstanding difficulty in shifting from a payg system to a funded one is of course the
transition period. Is there a way to avoid having to deal with a terminal generation? Gramlich (1996),
for example, gives three different ways of reforming the US social security system, two of them
resulting in a certain degree of funded systems and all of them comprising tax increases during the
transition period.
Buchanan (1986) suggests a solution to this problem, a solution that is very close to the one
adopted in Chile. First, let us state the fact that a payg system, being an implicit social contract
between generations, entails drawing rights/a mortgage on future production. In other words, the16
accrued pension rights of those belonging to today's working generation as well as of those already
retired are a public debt (cp. also Feldstein, 1974; Kotlikoff, 1995 and the literature and estimates on
'generation accounting'). Buchanan suggests that this implicit debt is made explicit; for each an every
person the value of the accrued pensions rights is to be calculated and an individual account set up,
in which this amount is deposited. From that day the capital in the individual accounts is earning
interest and new contributions go into the account.
With this proposal, the trick is made by increasing the public debt, thereby increasing the interest
payments instead of increasing taxes. Now the interest rate on the increased (or, rather, now explicit)
public debt is assumed to be paid by the efficiency gains that result from decreased deadweight losses
caused by decreased tax wedges. Here there seems to be a mixing up of differences between a payg
and a funded system and differences between a system with redistribution intra a generation and an
actuarial one. Buchanan presupposes that a transformation from a payg system to a funded one also
means a change to a system with a tight or perfect connection between expected contributions and
expected benefits.
Feldstein (1996) argues in a similar way. The fact that the rate of return has been lower than
would have been the case had the system been funded from the beginning is maintained to make the
financing of the US public payg system a tax. Since 1960 the average annual growth rate of the
economy has been 2.5%, while the return in the capital market has been 9%. The difference is said to
be a tax, causing excess burden in the same way as any other tax. The deadweight loss is calculated
using this difference times the Harberger deadweight loss. A compensated elasticity of the social
security pay roll tax base of 0.5 yields in a deadweight loss of $68 billion in 1995. Hence there will
be gains from a reform and such gains are estimated to compensate the transition costs.
The same comclusion is reached by Raffelhüschen & Risa (1995). Using a simulation model for a
small open economy (the interest rate and the real wage rate exogenous and determined in the
international market), calibrating the model with Norwegian figures, they show that announcement
of the reform and responses in the labour market and of bequests weaken the intergenerational
redistribution during the transition. In the long-run the welfare gains surpass the losses during the
transition fare gains surpass the losses during the transition.
Like many other economists today, Buchanan and Feldstein favour a transition to a funded system
and there are strong arguments supporting such a change. There are however risks in funded systems
as well. One obvious risk is of course the capital market risk. This is a well-known risk with
established ways of handling it: the trade-off between risk and return and a diversified portfolio. A
connected risk may be the pressure on the return that will be exercised by the pension fund.
Estimates of accrued pension rights in Sweden, for example,  today give an (implicit) pension debt of
4600 to 5000 thousand millions SEK, i.e. 3 to 4 times GDP. The capital stock in Sweden, including
real estate, is also 3 times GDP. No doubt, if in a funded system the pension fund(s) is playing a
leading role, effects on the rate of return should be expected. With international capital markets at
hand these risks are of course reduced, provided not all countries turn to funded systems.17
From a defined benefit to a defined contribution system
Most payg systems are defined-benefit systems, the benefits being flat rate or based on the loss of
income principle with benefits determined by income during the last x years before retirement.
Suppose that to be the case and the system is to be reformed to a defined contribution system with
individual accounts, fictitious or real. Problems?
Such a reform probably means that the redistribution between social-economic groups or between
people with different labour market behaviour, that took place in the defined benefit system, ceases.
In a pure defined-contribution system there will be a perfect connection between expected
contributions and expected benefits. The contributions will no longer be taxes; thus the reform
lowers the tax rate and reduces the deadweight loss. This argument has been used in the Swedish
debate in favour of a turn to a defined contribution system. According to Feldstein (1996), a
mandatory system means that the contributions are taxes, i.e the mere fact that the system is
mandatory turns the contributions into taxes, even if there is a full connection between contributions
and benefits. If we stick to the ordinary definition of a tax as opposed to a fee, a tax is levied without
a reciprocale benefit in contrast to a fee. The outcome evidently depends on how people perceive the
system, i.e. it is an empirical question too early to be settled.
A change from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution system affects different generations
differently. Suppose that those being pensioners when the reform is introduced remain in the old
system and that the young generation, those who have not yet entered the labour market, follows the
new system. Those belonging to the working generation have of course adjusted their behaviour to
the old system, the effects being more important the closer the retirement day. The Buchanan
solution, mentioned above, does not fully solve the problem. Think of a person 50 years old when
the reformed system starts. About two thirds of his or her working life have passed. The pension
rights accrued to his or her individual account will reflect his or her behaviour adjusted to the old
system. This may include part time work during many years, trusting the pension benefits not to be
affected as they were calculated in the old system on the wages during the latter part of the working
life.
Another way would be to let the old system gradually die. Suppose normal working age is
between 20 and 65. A person who is 25 years old when the new system starts will then get 5/45 of
the benefits determined by the old rules and 40/45 by the new ones. One draw-back is the very long
transition period, although the importance of the old system will decrease with every year that
elapses.18
11.4. The proposed transitions in Britain,  Italy and Sweden
We consider among the five countries examined in the present report, only the three western
economies (Sweden, UK, Italy), which have already implemented or have established the principles
on which the new pension system will be based. In those three countries the present pension policies
are quite different from those implemented in previous decades. The phase of the extension of
coverage and continuous improvement on benefits is over and a new phase of retrenchment and
downword revision of pension rights and entitlements has started. However past extensions and
improvements are still affecting expenditure and its growth. The object of this pharagraph then is to
consider how the entitlements accumulated in the public system under the old rules have been
treated, which are at present considered to be unsustainable and have been changed for future
generations of contributors.
Italy, Sweden, and the UK approach the prospect of transition from very different points of view,
which, on one side, mirror different interpretations of the push and pull factors of the reforms and
are, on the other side, the result of the different historical backgrounds to the respective pension
systems. The UK is the middle of the process and it is now possible to assess the impact of the 1986
reform, through which the public sector has reduced its importance in dealing with the problem of
income maintenance for the aged. Pension liabilities are reckoned to represent 0.6% of Gdp.  Italy
and Sweden  have just decided on a reform of the public system, motivated by the unsubstainability
and generosity of  the old rules and by worsening demographic prospects. The accumulated stock of
pension liabilities are estimated to amount between 2.5 and 3.5 times Gdp in Sweden and around
2.75 times Gdp in Italy.19
11.4.1. The reasons for reform
The push factors find their roots in the historical background of each pension system, in its
present performance, in the demographic prospects and in the ideological commitment. Very briefly
we summarise here the relevant points, which are better developed in the individual country studies
in the present report.
a) Historical background. All the three systems, even if they have come to the present structure
from different starting points, have a mix of assistance and insurance principles within the mandatory
public system. For example, the system guarantees a minimum pension to contributors; the pension is
earnings-related. Sweden and the UK had, since the beginning, a National Insurance basic pension,
where benefits and contributions were flat rate for all workers; to that  an income related
supplementary pensions was later added. The basic pension was meant to represent, at the end of the
1970s, 20% of the average male earnings in the UK. Its value, being kept constant in real terms,
declined with respect to  average earnings. As a result of the real growth of the latter, by 1994, the
relative value of the basic pension had fallen to 16%. The minimum was significantly higher in
Sweden, where it represented between 30-35% of the average income in 1994. In the UK the
supplementary mandatory part of the pension is mainly privately managed and funded;  in 1975 a
public, mandatory, payg, earnings-related  fund, the SERPS, was launched, for those who did not
belong to any privately managed occupational pension scheme. The benefit from the  supplementary
scheme was initially intended to increase the basic benefit by a maximum of 25% of the average
revalued earnings after 20 years. In Sweden the supplementary earnings-related pension scheme
(ATP) is public and mandatory, payg with a buffer: it has added on average to the basic benefits
approximatly 30% of the previous  income; some 10% of negotiated pension may be added to it,
which is particularly relevant for high earners as there is a ceiling on benefits in the public system.
Italy has mainly a public system where the two elements of the benefit (basic and supplementary) are
not distinguished: the entry pension is a function of the pensionable income (last x years' incomes)
and of the accrual rate multiplied by the years of service, provided that the pension is above a certain
minimum. That minimum is approximatly 30% of the average male earnings; integration to the
minimum is means-tested.
As a result, in 1994, in the UK, Sweden and Italy almost 100% of the working population are
enrolled in a public pension scheme. In Sweden 80% of the pensioners receive a supplementary
pension, in the UK 27% of the working population are members of SERPS; supplementary pensions
are either voluntary or occupational for a minority of workers in Italy. The proportion of privately
funded individuals is very low (3-5%) in Italy and Sweden; on the contrary in the UK the proportion
is above 50%. Almost all pensions in the mandatory schemes (both privatly or publicly managed) are
paid in the three countries according to defined-benefit criteria, so that the income-maintenance aim
provides the guiding principle. General taxation covers about  50% of the basic pension, and 24% of
ATP in Sweden is covered by interest earned by the fund; it covers the deficit of the public schemes
in the UK  (about 10% of the expenditure). In Italy general taxation covers the general support to
the employees' public schemes, fixed by the law, or approximately 15% of the expenditure; general20
taxation also covers the contribution cuts corresponding to early retirements and  unemployment
benefits (5.5% of the annual expenditure): all together general taxation then covers about 22% of the
pension expenditure for private employees. Again in Italy the state support for farmers is
comparatively much higher and covers approximatly 90% of the farmers' pension expenditure.
The separation of assistance from insurance has not been seen as the main aim in the Swedish and
British reform, where a basic income continues to be part of the public pension system; partly
financed by general taxation, the level of the minimum  is guaranteed in real terms and is not indexed
to real earnings. The Italian system had mixed up things to a larger extent and the reform has
correspondingly been more radical: redistribution to the worse-off has to do with welfare policies,
which are not financed by the mandatory pension system, but by a special national program.
b)  Major inefficiencies of the systems. Italy and Sweden  have the highest level of public
expenditure for the aged over Gdp and the worst prospects for the equilibrium rate in the long run.
The relatively high degree of protection and the weak connection between contributions and benefits
favours those in dynamic careers and encourages leisure time. The subsidisation of leisure time
occurs in different ways: in Sweden the short period of contribution was incentivated by the ceiling
on the accrual rate after a certain number of years of contributions; in Italy the same kind of incentive
operated by allowing people to retire earlier than the legal age with a low requirement in paid
contributions. The high level of unemployment had also a major impact on the decision to retire
young and receiving a pension. The introduction of an actuarial fairness principle in Sweden and Italy
was thus seen as the solution to the inefficiency. The introduction of a flexible age of retirement with
a demographic coefficient in the formula increased the freedom of choice of individuals concerning
the age of retirement. This approach has been more extreme in Italy, where most welfare and
assistance provisions have been removed from the social security schemes.The Swedish choice has
been less radical:. the shift has been from a public, payg (with a buffer), defined-benefit system with a
minimum-income guarantee to a public, payg, defined-contribution, partly funded system, again with
a minimum-income guarantee partly financed via general taxation. In the UK the financial
unsustainability of SERPS was seen, at the time of the 1986 reform, as the major problem of the
public system; opting out was encouraged and the accrual rate of SERPS was reduced from 1.25%
to 1%. However in that way the main problem, i.e. the relative poverty of pensioners, has not been
tackled.
c)  Demographic prospects. The long run demographic prospects are quite uncertain. Fertility rate
can fluctuate even in the short run; migration flows are dependent on economic and social factors.
The demographic forecasts elaborated by national bodies, moreover, are based on different
assumptions. The results, however, even if not strictly comparable, are quite reliable as far as the
direction of change is concerned, particularly for the next twenty years. The ageing of the population
will be comparatively much more relevant in Italy, where the dependency rates of the aged above 65
are foreseen to rise by the year 2030 up to 28% (the increase will be of 12 points from 1994). The
corresponding figure for Sweden will be a much less striking 22%; the increase also will be less21
dramatic over the same period (4.5 points). In the U.K the dependency rate is expected to reach 20%
in 2030, with a 5 percentage points increase.
d) The ideological commitment. The ideological opposition to State interference in private
financial planning was particularly strong in the UK, where opting out  and personal pensions plans
were encouraged with the reform of 1986. The problem of old age income security is left to the
individual choice and to the market.The superiority of funded versus payg systems whenever  r> g+n
has been explicitly taken as an argument for the a downsizing of the public payg system in Sweden
and for the promotion of a completely funded schemes. Ten percent of the contributions will finance
the  funded schemes and there will be free choice whether to place the money in the hands of the
State or in the hands of private competing agencies. In Italy the superiority af a privately managed
funded scheme was not considered as a relevant point: the private occupational funds are
incentivated by lower taxation, but remain so far on a very small scale.22
11.4.2. The long-run expected outcomes of  reforms
The reforms are expected generally to reduce or stabilise in general the expenditure on public
pension over Gdp, even if the  proportion of the aged will increase as a result of several changes: on
coverage, degree of protection, age of retirement. Generally the macroeconomic assumption
however are exogenous and do not consider the impact on behaviour of the changes introduced for
the individuals in the labour markets and in retirement decisions (e.g. choice of retirement age and of
invalidity pensions). Ideally the behaviour of individuals should be endogenized, particularly when, as
in the case of Italy and Sweden, the freedom of choice of individuals as to retirement age has been
increased.
The expected outcome in terms of expenditure and budget equilibrium are then only indicative
and will need periodic revisions, which are likely to afford scope for new corrections.
As far as expenditure is concerned the national estimates show in 1994 the following.
- In Italy and Sweden the stabilisation and possible reduction of the pension expenditure over Gdp
will occur as a result of an increase in the age of retirement (and/ or of the utilisation of the
demographic coefficient) given the assumtion of an unchanged behaviour. The separation of social
insurance from assistance will reduce in the Italian case the proportion of expenditure on pension
schemes financed by general taxation. That separation does not however necessarily imply that the
poverty relief for the aged will require a relative lower public expenditure; that will depend on
several factors, among which  labour market behaviour. In the case of Italy the contrary might occur:
higher flexibility and a lower degree of protection for self-employment might in fact induce an
increase in the proportion of those who will not be able to accumulate enough capitalised
contributions to reach a pension above the social minimum.
- In the U.K the reduction of expenditure is the result of  the reduction of the relative amount of
basic pensions and of the accrual rate in SERPS decided in 1986.
- The aged will receive in all the three countries their income from a wider range of sources than
at present; in particular a higher proportion will come from privately managed mandatory
occupational funds: 10% in Sweden, 15/23 % in the UK; 10-15% in Italy as the sum of mandatory
professional funds and of voluntary occupational schemes.23
11.4.3 The  transition
As can be easily understood, the prospect of transition is completely different in the case of a
massive privatisation (UK) compared to the cases of Sweden and Italy, where rules have been
changed in the public system in order to make it work according to an actuarial fairness principle.
The definition and the extension of acquired rights is dependent on age (Sweden) or dependent on
the time when the contributions were made (Italy and UK). The result is that the transition is a very
long process, with the old system still working in full to compute the benefits for the next 20 years or
more.
Very considerable differences on the replacement rates at retirement will then occur in Italy and
Sweden between those who are aged 40/45 and those who are aged 35/40. The main differences
arise from the utilization of life expectancy estimates in the calculation of the pension. As changes
are more radical with the Italian reform, the differences between generations (in particular between
those who benefit from the special rules of the transition and those to whom the new rules entirely
apply) will be more relevant. A very long period during which multiple rules are applied has been
adopted in the UK with the reduction in the accrual rate in the SERPS: those retiring before 1999
are unaffected by the reform.  For those retiring after 1999 a pro-quota criterion is applied and pre-
reform contributions are credited according to pre reform rules, contributions paid post-reform are
credited according to the post-reform rules. As a result the new SERPS pension scheme will reach
maturity only in the second part of the next century.
* The pensioners receiving a pension with the old rules will, however, not share the dividends of
real growth  after retirement in Italy and in Sweden. In the UK  the reform of indexation of the  basic
pension was decided before the reform of 1986 and it has contributed powerfully, as already
mentioned, to reduce very quickly the replacement rate at retirement and the dimension of the public
sector involvement dealing with income guarantee in old age.
* In Sweden the building of the second pillar by reducing contributions to the payg  system is
likely to create a problem to the financing the transition.  The buffer fund in ATP, which was
accumulated during the introductory phase of the system, will have to be used.24
11.5  Final Remarks.
Some of the upshots from the transition chapter are summarized here.
What follows concerns mandatory social security. Transition is a general term which refers to the
passage from a set of characteristics to another set of characteristics of a pension system. A full list
of  contrasting characteristics, with respect to which transition can be defined, is given in the chapter
itself.  The text makes it clear that, in practical terms, only a few contrasting characteristics are
relevant, namely insurance vs. assistance, defined contribution vs. defined benefit, funded vs. payg.
We argue that the last couple of characteristics, although it is so very often talked about, does not
constitute the ‘heart of the matter’, as it were, in discussing actual transition processes. In particular,
while the introduction of a payg system is a Pareto improvement, the change in the opposite
direction can hardly be approved of on the basis of the Pareto criterion. Arguments in favour of a
transition in the latter sense, although very popular, are based on highly hypothetical assessments of
the efficiency gains from the exercise and underplay the significance of capital markets risks. In
particular, it is sometimes too lightly assumed that equities systematically outperform bonds by a
significant margin. This fundamental asymmetry makes today a transition from the current payg
method to the principle of funding social security a passage very difficult to be accepted and put in
practice, particularly in those countries were the public payg system cover the majority of pension
enitlements.
Current transition problems, we argue, arise from a different source.  First and foremost they arise
from the fact that current systems are no longer viable. Current public systems have to change the
implicit social contract on which they are based for future generation of pensioners, while the present
generation of workers (or the future generation of pensioners) have to cope with the commitment of
maintaining the promises implied by the past rules to new pensioners. Manipulation of current payg
systems has meant confounding insurance and assistance together and powerfully contributing to
make current social security systems unsustainable.
We argue that social security should be based on contributions and should follow the insurance
principle, while social assistance should be financed by taxes and should be based on welfare
principles. In other words a useful benchmark, against which  assess transitions taking place in
practice, is not merely the passage from public payg to private funded system; it is much more
usefully provided by the passage to a defined-contribution actuarially fair system, as the objective
to which the transition process should lead.
In practice, this statement must be supplemented by the following considerations:
a) the system should be designed under the constraint that, when in full operation, its budget
balances within a cohort (or, more restrictively, within each single year)
b) the system should enable all participants to enjoy a pension income at least equal to the poverty
threshold, thus including a limited intra-generational redistributive (assistance-welfare) element;
c) the system should contain no negative fertility bias. Since a pension system is in itself a
disincentive to fertility, the system should be injected with antibodies as countervailing forces to that
bias;25
d) the system should not discourage private saving.
The above seems to be what present systems need to achieve: in that light current transition
processes can be interpreted as modes to reach in practice a mix of efficiency and fairness under a
viability constraint. Of course the essential issue in the criteria and design of the transition lies in the
judgment of fairness and in the decision on who is going to bear the cost of the transformation:
whether the new generation of pensioners should receive less than promised (lower than expected
benefits), or whether the future generation of pensioners should pay more (higher contribution for
given promises). If we can assume that under the transformed system contributions are no longer
perceived as a marginal tax, than the transformation will produce efficiency gains and  the present
generation of workers may receive more by obtaing a higher rate of return on their contributions.
The cost of the transition may be worthwhile even to the present generation of workers. More
efficiency may mean reduced disincentives to labour supply or  fostering new savings. One possible
way of conceiving of transition process, under conditions that appear to be realistically suggested by
the analysis of the experience of the Western countries in the present report, is that the perverse
incentives can be turned into right incentives without having to bear the heavy costs and the higher
risks entailed by a reversal to a fully-funded system.
Looking at the Italian, Swedish and UK experiences, we can see three different ways according to
which the path toward a more viable system has been designed, also entailing a different relative size
of the public agency in pension management.The Italian case has been to move from a payg, defined
benefit, public system toward a public, payg, actuarially fair (at the individual level, or ‘pure’),
defined contribution system. Virtually most of the negative incentives to the labour market have been
removed by removing most welfare and assistance provisions from the social security schemes.  In
the trade off between efficiency and equity in the public pension system greater weight has been
given to the former. Redistribution is the job of the fiscal system and not of the pension system.
However, the high level of the promises of the existing system and the sanctity of acquired rights
have induced the Italian legislator to design a very long transition process with little equity among
cohorts during the course of the transition. This generosity will be financed partly via general
taxation and partly by imposing on several generations of pensioners a reduction in the level of
indexation. The cost of the transformation is then shared by all the cohorts in different proportions.
In principle then the gain in efficiency in the labour market could give rise to  higher rate of returns
for future pensioners, although the higher level of taxation (higher in relative terms toward present-
day workers) may somewhat reduce these benefits.
The Swedish choice has been less radical. The shift is from a public payg (with a buffer), defined
benefit with a minimum income guarantee toward a public, payg, defined contribution, partly funded
again with a minimum income guarantee partly financed via general taxation.  Disincentives to labour
supply have been reduced, though  not completely eliminated in order to preserve some
redistribution to the worse-off via the pension system itself.  Efficiency gains are expected,  both
from the labour market and in the longer run from a rise in savings. Compared to Italy, the sanctity
of acquired rights has been less radically preserved. Even if transition continues to be a very long26
process, the difference among cohorts in their degree of protection is moderate and financed by the
fund accumulated in the past under supplementary rules (so-called ATP), so that in the short-run the
increase in total savings is not certain.
The case of UK has to be seen in a different perspective: the public sector has acquired a
decreasing importance in dealing with  income security in old age. The transformation induced by the
1986 reform had as its main objective further to reduce public intervention and strong  incentives
have been established for personal saving funds. The system is projected then to have a lower payg
proportion: the transformation implied then partakes more of the nature of a passage from a public
payg to a private funded system. The British case embodies, to a larger extent, the so-called three-
pillars ohilosophy.  Results have been so far an largely disappointing, with an increase in the level of
poverty of the old and the  cost of the transformation having fallen  so far on the current generation
of pensioners.27
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